The Supreme Court as the Grand Mediator in Social Regulation of the Media - De Gustibus Non Disputandum Est: Or Are They by Hunter, Richard J. et al.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 32 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-2009
The Supreme Court as the Grand Mediator in
Social Regulation of the Media - De Gustibus Non




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard J. Hunter, Ann M. Mayo, and Hector R. Lozada, The Supreme Court as the Grand Mediator in Social Regulation of the Media - De
Gustibus Non Disputandum Est: Or Are They, 32 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 41 (2009).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol32/iss1/2
The Supreme Court as the "Grand
Mediator" in Social Regulation of the
Media
De Gustibus Non Disputandum Est: Or
Are They?
by
RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR.,'
ANN M. MAYO,*
& HECTOR R. LOZADA4
I. Introduction ................................................................................... 42
II. A Constitutional Backdrop from History ................................. 43
A. Absolute Freedom or Is There Room for Some
R egulation? .......................................... . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .  48
B. Censorship, the Media, and Prior Restraint: A Brief
R eview ................................................................................... . . 49
C. Should the State Punish a "Secular Sacrilege"? ...................... 51
III. Regulation of Indecent Speech in Broadcast Media:
Administrative Agencies "Channel" and "Restrict" .............. 54
A. Enter the "Satiric Humorist" George Carlin ..................... 55
B. A Procedural Fragment and Quagmire in the DC Circuit? ...57
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In ........................................... 59
1. Was the "Filthy Words" Monologue Indecent or
Merely Satire? Or Perhaps Both? ................................. 60
2. The Constitutional Attack .............................................. 61
Richard J. Hunter, Jr. is Professor of Legal Studies at Seton Hall University and
Adjunct Professor of Law at Rutgers University (Newark) School of Law.
* Ann Mayo is Senior Faculty Associate in the Stillman School of Business and
Director of the Program in Sport Management at Seton Hall University.
6 Hector Lozada is Associate Professor of Marketing, Seton Hall University and a
Fellow of the Institute for International Business.
42 HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. [32:1
3. Context Provides a Clue to Supreme Court Analysis:
The M edia as Intruder .................................................... 64
IV. The New Media: The Internet and the First Amendment ..... 66
A. Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation Summary and Redux ....... 69
B. The Supreme Court Moves to Its Analysis ......................... 72
C. Are Legal and Definitional Ambiguities and
Constitutional Burdens Endemic to the Proposed
Regulation of the Internet? ............................ . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . 74
D. What About the Affirmative Defenses? Might These
"Save the CD A "? .................................................................. 77
E . The D ecision ........................................................................... 78
V. Law and Technology after Reno v. ACLU ................................ 79
A . Congress A gain A cts ............................................................. 81
B. Child Online Protection Act ................................................ 82
C . A shcroft H ............................................................................... 85
D. The Children's Internet Protection Act .............................. 89
VI. Implications and Tentative Conclusions .................................... 94
A . International Implications ..................................................... 94
B. Returning to the Core Issue Concerning Technology ..... 98
C. Concluding Com m ents ............................................................. 100
I. Introduction
The law is often seen as the grand mediator between what
individuals want to see and hear and what society, writ large,
determines an individual ought to see and hear. Because of this,
issues of diversity, choice, and taste are especially at the forefront in
the area of entertainment law. In this context, the United States
Constitution operates as the medium for this mediation function. The
Constitution provides the standard to evaluate the various regulatory
and statutory schemes that are designed to strike a balance between
individual rights and societal concerns in a broad area of the law
called "social regulation" of the media.
Contemporary students of the law and the media (broadly
construed to include motion pictures, DVDs, music, books, the radio
and television, and more recently, the Internet) may consider the
issue to be new or novel, fully dependent on modern means of
communication and delivery. Interestingly, the debate may have
been framed most aptly in the historical context of the 1950s, with its
genesis in a somewhat anachronistic case, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
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Wilson.' In Burstyn the court addressed the proposed banning of a
film on the ground that it was "sacrilegious., 2 After reviewing the
facts, law, and implications of Burstyn in Part II, Part III of this article
will continue the societal and constitutional dialogue by reviewing the
restrictions imposed on the public airways (the radio) by reviewing
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, a case
in which an objection was raised as to the content of a broadcast
which was not judged to be "obscene," but instead "indecent."3 In
Part IV, this article will discuss the constitutionality of two statutory
provisions that were enacted by Congress to protect minors from
"indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet,
as presented in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.4 Part V of
this article reviews two congressional statutes enacted in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union that specifically relate to information and images received on
the Internet.
Finally, in Part VI, we will offer some concluding comments
relating to the international aspects of controls placed on the
Internet, most especially by China, and the general issues presented
by the use of Internet filters as society moves to control the messages
received via the Internet, especially for one particular class of
American citizens.
In this analysis, we raise several practical and policy questions.
What should be the parameters of regulation in these areas? Is there
a role for society through its elected officials or through the
regulatory process? Are matters of taste not subject to dispute? And
who would settle such disputes?
II. A Constitutional Backdrop from History
I have reached the conclusion.., that under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in the area are
constitutionally limited to hard core pornography. I shall not
today attempt further to define the kind of materials I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
1. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
2. Id. at 497.
3. 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978).
4. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
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and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it ... '
The core issue presented in Burstyn v. Wilson was rather
straightforward: "the constitutionality, under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which permitted the
banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are
sacrilegious."6  The words of the statute seemed simple and
straightforward enough. The first paragraph of the statute, a standard
licensing statute, made it unlawful:
to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place
of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in
the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel...
unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid
license or permit thereof of the education department ....
However, the statute further provided:
The director of the (motion picture) division (of the education
department) or, when authorized by the regents, the officers
of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly
examined every motion picture submitted to them as herein
required, and unless such film or part thereof is obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such
character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt the morals
or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefore. If such
director or, when authorized, such officer shall not license any
film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefore a
5. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 121-22 (Ruth Bloom ed., Aspen Publishers,
Inc. 2001).
6. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 497.
7. Id. (citation omitted). See also 51 AM. JUR. 2d Licenses and Permits § 50 (1970).
"The right of a municipal corporation to impose [revenue license charges] upon an
occupation or business which is conducted within the city limits, although a portion of the
business was carried on outside of the city, is generally recognized." City of Sedalia v.
Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 66 F.2d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1933) (citations omitted). Generally,
the legislature cannot confer on a municipality the power to impose revenue license
charges on occupations carried on outside the municipality's territorial limits. White v.
City of Decatur, 144 So. 873, 874 (Ala. 1932) (citations omitted). Accord City of Sedalia v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1936); Robinson v. City of Norfolk, 60
S.E. 762, 763 (Va. 1908).
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written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description
of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.8
After granting a license for the showing of the film The Miracle9
on November 30, 1950, the New York State Board of Regents
received "hundreds of letters, telegrams, post cards, affidavits, and
other communications" both in protest and in support of the
exhibition of the film.' ° As a result, the Chancellor of the Board of
Regents requested that three members of the Board, which
constitutes the statutory head of the state department of education,
view the film." After viewing the film, this committee reported to the
Board that, in its opinion, there was a basis for the claim that the
picture was "sacrilegious."' 12  On January 19, 1951, the Regents
directed the distributor to show cause, at a hearing scheduled for
January 30, why its license to show The Miracle should not be
8. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted).
9. For a very interesting historical review of the factual circumstances and
background of the case, including an insight into the role played by the Roman Catholic
Church, Francis Cardinal Spellman, and the "Legion of Decency," see Marjorie Heins, The
Miracle: Film Censorship and the Entanglement of Church and State (2003), reprinted in
DEFENDING THE FIRST: COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES AND CASES,
(J. Russomanno ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2005), available at www.fepproject.
org/commentaries/themiracle.html. As noted by the author: "Late in December 1950, an
obscure foreign movie called 11 Miracolo opened at the Paris Theater in Manhattan.
Directed by the pioneer of Italian neorealism, Roberto Rossellini, The Miracle is a
religious parable featuring a dim-witted peasant woman, Nanni (played brilliantly by
Anna Magnani), who is plied with drink and then seduced by a vagabond whom she
mistakes in her stupor for St. Joseph. (St. Joseph is played by the young Federico Fellini,
who also wrote the screenplay.)" Id. Cardinal Spellman is described as a "right-winger"
whose political power was such that he was known as the "American Pope." Id.
Ironically, Cardinal Spellman had not seen The Miracle, but he had heard about it from
various sources. Id. Apparently, as Heins notes, this was enough for him to condemn the
film as "a despicable affront to every Christian" and "a vicious insult to Italian
womanhood" which should really be named "'Woman Further Defamed,' by Roberto
Rossellini." Id. Accord Spellman Urges 'Miracle' Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1951, at 1,
14 (quoting the entire statement of the Cardinal). Spellman said it was "a blot upon the
escutcheon of the Empire State that no means of appeal to the Board of Regents is
available to the people for the correcting of the mistake made by its motion picture
division" in giving a license to exhibit The Miracle in the first place. Id. See also ALAN
WESTIN, THE MIRACLE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MOVIES 9 (University of
Alabama Press 1961); Bosley Crowther, The Strange Case of 'The Miracle,' ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1951, at 37.
A much longer summary of the plot of the film may be found in Burstyn, 343 U.S.
at 507-09 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).





rescinded on that ground. 3 Appellant appeared at the hearing which
was conducted by the very three-member committee that had
previously reviewed the film." It challenged the jurisdiction of the
committee to proceed with the case. 5 On February 16, 1951, the
Regents, after viewing the film, determined that it was indeed
"sacrilegious" and ordered the Commissioner of Education to rescind
the license to exhibit the picture. 16 The Commissioner did so at the
behest of the Board.
7
In challenging the determination of the Board of Regents, the
appellant, Joseph Burstyn, Inc., brought suit in New York based on
several grounds. First, that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment 8 as a prior restraint on freedom of speech and of the
press. Second, that the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a violation of the separation of church and state and as
a prohibition of the free exercise of religion. Finally, that the term




16. Id. at 499.
17. Id.
18. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend XIV.
19. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 499. The exact nature of a party's due process rights is
normally determined in a hearing or trial before either a judicial, executive, or
administrative tribunal. Procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of
"fundamental fairness." At a minimum, procedural due process would include an
individual's right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings involving him/her or
his/her interests, and the opportunity to be heard. This minimum protection extends to all
proceedings by the government or by "other parties" that can result in an individual's
deprivation, whether civil or criminal in nature, of life, liberty, or property. An important
analysis made by the late Judge Henry Friendly denotes these important procedural
safeguards in both content and relative priority in evaluating whether a party has been
accorded due process of law: an unbiased tribunal, notice of the proposed action and the
grounds asserted for it, opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not
be taken, the right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses, the right to
know opposing evidence, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, a decision based
exclusively on the evidence presented, opportunity to be represented by counsel,
requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented, requirement
that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons (conclusions of law) for its
decision. See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975).
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The Appellate Division rejected all of these contentions and
upheld the Regent's determination.' On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals, New York's highest state court, affirmed the order
of the Appellate Division." The case reached the United States
Supreme Court on appeal.22
By the time the United States Supreme Court considered Burstyn,
it was well established that despite any earlier opinion to the contrary,
the "liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment"
guarantees against abridgement by the federal government is within
the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action., 24  The Supreme Court
noted that Burstyn was the first case to present squarely the question
whether "motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which
the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of
'speech' or 'the press.' ' 25
The Court concluded that "expression by means of motion
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of
the First and Fourteenth Amendment., 26  In so doing, the Court
rejected twin contentions, the first being that motion pictures should
not fall within the protection of the First Amendment because "their
production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business
conducted for private profit., 27  The Court stated that it was well-
decided that the fact that "books, newspapers, and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First
20. Burstyn v. Wilson, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
21. Burstyn v. Wilson, 101 N.E.2d 665 (N.Y. 1951).
22. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 499.
23. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I.
24. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 500 (citations omitted). The Court made reference to its
earlier decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 499-501. See also Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Paula Alexander Becker,
Is It Time to Revisit the Doctrine of 'State Action' in the Context of Intercollegiate and
Interscholastic Sports? 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 192-98 (2007) (discussing the
incorporation doctrine, and the debate that has ensued between "selective" rather than
"total" incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights).
25. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
26. Id. at 502, n.12 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166
(1948): "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included
in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
27. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
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Amendment." ' The Court failed to ascertain any reason why the
production and showing of a motion picture for profit should result in
any different treatment or in a different conclusion than would be
compelled by a traditional First Amendment analysis.29
Secondly, the Court also rejected the contention that motion
pictures "possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the
youth of a community, than other modes of expression" and thus
might be subject to disqualification from First Amendment
protection.3 ° The Court concluded that "[e]ven if one were to accept
this hypothesis, it does not follow that motion pictures should be
disqualified from First Amendment Protection., 31  Interestingly,
however, the Court noted that "[i]f there be capacity for evil it may
be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community
control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship
such as we have here. 32  This vague formulation leaves open a
potentially permissible scope of community control, a consideration
which will be relevant to the forthcoming discussion of restrictions
placed on the media concerning issues relating to minors.
A. Absolute Freedom or Is There Room for Some Regulation?
Having decided that the "liberty of expression by means of
motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,, 3  the Court noted that this protection is not absolute
and does not extend to a right to "exhibit every motion picture of
every kind at all times and all places." 3  Perhaps prophetically,
presaging the amazing technological changes to come, the Court also
noted: "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject
to the precise rules governing any other particular method of
expression."35  What the Court did make clear, however, is an
important constitutional principle: "the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not
vary. Those principles.., make freedom of expression the rule.
There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id.





35. Id. at 503.
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rule."36 The Supreme Court left open the question, however, whether
there might be cases in which such a justification exists.37
The Supreme Court also tackled two additional issues. The first
was the issue of a prior restraint imposed by the New York state
regulation which did not seek to punish offensive speech, but which
required that "permission to communicate ideas be obtained in
advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and
pictures sought to be communicated., 38 The second issue involved the
criteria of "sacrilege" as a possible exception to the general rule.3 9
B. Censorship, the Media, and Prior Restraint: A Brief Review
The First Amendment does not protect all forms of speech.'
However, the government may not establish a system of censorship to
regulate in advance what may be uttered or spoken.41  Thus, the
government is generally restricted from seeking to enjoin different
36. Id.
37. Id. at 505-06.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 504.
40. While outside the narrow focus of this article, Justice Murphy, writing for a
unanimous Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, identified certain exceptions:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In terms of a discussion of censorship and the media, the
discussion of "obscenity" may be most relevant.
As stated in Chaplinsky, obscenity is not an essential part of the expression of
ideas, is of "slight social value," and the benefits derived are outweighed by the social
interest in morality. 315 U.S. at 572. Obscenity is not communication and is, by definition,
"utterly without redeeming social importance." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957). Obscenity lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Based upon both Roth and Miller, obscenity is the
description or depiction of sexual conduct which, taken as a whole, by the average person:
(i) appeals to the prurient interest in sex, using a community standard; (ii) is patently
offensive and an affront to contemporary community standards; and (iii) lacks serious
value (literary, artistic, political, or scientific), using a national reasonable person standard.
41. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1989) (noting
that to avoid the risk of prior restraint on speech, the government must use "rigorous




forms of speech or to employ other forms of prior or previous
restraints.42
Professors Lockhart, Kamisar, and Chopper frame the issue
thusly:
At the risk of oversimplifying, a prior restraint is a method of
regulating communication that empowers the government to
decide in advance whether particular persons may engage in a
desired communication; such decisions ordinarily take the
form of governmental orders or court injunctions restraining
particular persons from engaging in specified communicative
activities, or requiring that a prior license or permit be
obtained to engage in such activities. 3
Would this general proscription apply to the New York statute?
As a rule, the Supreme Court has been especially concerned
about a variety of restrictions that may be considered as "previous
restraint" on speech that are to be "especially condemned."
44
However, once again, the Court noted "the protection even as to
previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has
been recognized only in exceptional cases."45 This imposes a heavy
burden on the State to demonstrate that a specific limitation, statute,
or administrative regulation would provide such an exceptional case.
Several "exceptional circumstances," however, have been held to
warrant an application of prior restraint. For example, in Near v.
Minnesota, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment would
not bar an injunction against publishing the sailing date of troop ships
in times of war.46  In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, the
Supreme Court held that an injunction may issue as a prior restraint
against media reporting of criminal proceedings in order to preserve a
fair trial if (i) there is a clear and present danger that pretrial publicity
would threaten a fair trial, (ii) alternative measures are inadequate,
and (iii) an injunction would effectively protect the accused.47  In
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, the Supreme Court held that a court may
issue a protective order against the dissemination of information
42. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
43. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 591 (West
Publishing Company 1970)(5th ed. 1981).
44. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713-19).
45. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716).
46. 283 U.S. at 713-22.
47. 427 U.S. 539,562 (1976).
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gained through the process of pretrial discovery and which has not yet
been admitted at trial on the ground that there is a substantial
governmental interest in preventing abuse of information that would
not have been obtained from other sources. '
In these "exceptional cases," the Supreme Court has recognized
that strong procedural safeguards are constitutionally required.49
Unless there is a real question of an emergency, some form of
adversary hearing-conducted after adequate notice to all interested
parties-is generally required in any case where freedom of speech is
burdened by a prior restraint.' However, a permanent injunction
forbidding the distribution of a publication that, after a full judicial
hearing, is determined to be obscene may be upheld.51 In terms of a
"large-scale" seizure of allegedly obscene books and films, such
actions clearly constitute a prior restraint and must be preceded by a
full adversary hearing and a judicial determination concerning the
core issue of obscenity. 2 Seizing copies of a film (or a book) to
preserve them as evidence for a judicial determination is permitted
"pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination of probable
cause by a neutral magistrate .... And, as noted, a prompt judicial
determination of obscenity must be available after the seizure."
As stated in Burstyn, "[i]n the light of the First Amendment's
history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy burden to
demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an
exceptional case"-a burden the state could not bear.
C. Should the State Punish a "Secular Sacrilege"?
The second issue deals with the definition of sacrilege as defined
by New York's highest court: "no religion, as that word is understood
48. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
49. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62.
50. See Carroll v. Prince Anne County, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (invalidating the
award of an ex parte injunction restraining members of a political party from holding
rallies); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (holding that "a noncriminal
process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the
dangers of a censorship system."); Friendly, supra note 19 (promulgating a list of basic
"due process" safeguards according to Judge Friendly).
51. See Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 734
(1961)(citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957)).
52. See New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 873 (1986)(citations omitted).
53. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483,492 (1973).
54. Id.
55. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 504.
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by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt,
mockery, scorn and ridicule. 56  Does this formulation lead to an
exception to the rule of freedom of expression, "which a state may
carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of
society[?]"57
In response, the Supreme Court addressed a number of concerns
regarding the power of the censor. 8 The court concluded that the
New York court's definition of "sacrilegious" was "broad and all-
inclusive."59 As a result, "the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea
amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts
but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies.
6°
Because of this unbridled discretionary power, the Supreme Court
noted that "the most careful and tolerant censor would find it
virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and
he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression
of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority., 61 The Court
thus concluded that New York could not vest such unlimited
discretionary powers in a censor exercising power on behalf of the
state.62
Secondly, an application of the "sacrilegious" standard might
raise further constitutional questions "under the First Amendment's
56. Id. (citing Burstyn v. Wilson, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (1951)). The New York Court
of Appeals offered the following additional definition for sacrilegious: "the act of violating
or profaning anything sacred." 101 N.E.2d at 670. In upholding the regulation, the Court
of Appeals also approved the Appellate Division's interpretation: "[a]s the court below
said of the statute in question, 'All it purports to do is bar a visual caricature of religious
beliefs held sacred by one sect or another .... .- Id. at 672 (citation omitted). The
dissenting opinion of Justice Fuld refutes this formulation and definition. Justice Fuld
states: "The drastic nature of such a ban is highlighted by the fact that the film in question
makes no direct attack on, or criticism of, any religious dogma or principle, and it is not
claimed to be obscene, scurrilous, intemperate or abusive." Id. at 680 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
57. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 504.
58. Id. at 505.
59. Id. at 504.
60. Id. at 504-05.
61. Id. at 505.
62. Id. See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 292 n.1 (1951) (involving a New
York City ordinance that made it unlawful to hold worship meetings on the street without
first obtaining a permit from the city police commissioner and making it an offense to
"ridicule or denounce any form of religious belief ... ").
[32:1
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guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for
all." 63
In summary, in analyzing the New York statutory and regulatory
regime under a First Amendment freedom of speech standard, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that New York had "no
legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views
distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon
the expression of those views. '' The Court concluded in very strong
language: "It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine,
whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures." 65
Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, presaged an apt summary of the important policy
questions that would later be addressed in Burstyn v. Wilson:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have
been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false
statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
63. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 505. For an exhaustive discussion of the meaning of
sacrilege, see id. at 518-33 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also id. at 533-40
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 505.
65. Id. By implication, the Court alluded to what is termed "the Establishment
Clause." Under an Establishment Clause analysis, it is improper for the government to
sponsor or endorse a religion, to financially support a religion, or to become actively
involved in religious activities. See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
The Establishment Clause also bars official preference of one religious denomination (in
this case, the Catholic Church) over another. Any such law or regulation would be subject
to strict scrutiny analysis and would be held unconstitutional unless the government proves
that the law or regulation meets some compelling state interest. See Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982). If a law is facially neutral, as might be argued in Burstyn-
since the regulation appears to impact only those motion pictures that are "sacrilegious,"
without referencing any particular religion's doctrine or tenets-the Court will apply what
has come to be known as the "Lemon Test." Under this test, the law or governmental
action must: have a secular purpose, have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (internal citations omitted).
In applying the test enunciated above, the Court will also consider whether the
challenged government practice has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion. See
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
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enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief
can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this
shield more necessary than in our own country for a people
composed of many races and of many creeds. 66
III. Regulation of Indecent Speech in Broadcast Media:
Administrative Agencies "Channel" and "Restrict"
The State has consistently maintained that it has an interest in
protecting children from "sexually offensive materials. 6 7 The State's
focus may be especially centered on broadcast media because of its
overwhelming potential for direct and instantaneous transmission
into the home through a wide variety of vehicles, modes, and
equipment. In Part III of the article, we analyze censorship of the
radio. Indeed, "[o]f special concern to the [Federal Communications]
Commission as well as parents is the first point regarding the use of
radio by children."'
Traditionally, judges, legislators, and regulators have advanced
several justifications for treating broadcast speech differently than
other forms of expression. 9  The Federal Communications
Commission has enunciated and embraced "special considerations" in
the context of radio transmissions.70  Today, many of these
considerations would have equal, perhaps more prescient,
implications for the Internet given the increased prevalence of
personal computers, mobile computing, Internet-capable phones, and
instant messaging capabilities. Although not all of the rationales
would obtain, these special considerations include the fact that
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a
place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra
deference . . . (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station
66. 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
67. See, e.g., Laura Vanderstappen, Internet Pharmacies and the Specter of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 619, 635-36 (2006) (citing
American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
68. Pacifica Found. Station, 56 F.C.C.2d 94,97(1975).
69. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 n.2 (1978) (citations omitted).
70. Pacifica Found. Station, 56 F.C.C.2d at 96-97 (citations omitted).
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without any warning that offensive language is being or will be
broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the
use of which the government must therefore license in the
public interest.71
Congress has broadly empowered the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), the successor to the Federal Radio
Commission, with a wide variety of administrative tools and powers.
These include the power of the FCC to revoke a station's license,
issue a cease and desist order, or impose a monetary forfeiture for a
violation of section 1464 of the Communications Act of 1934.72 In
addition, the FCC can also deny license renewal or grant a short term
renewal.73
The FCC has found that there is a constitutional power to
regulate indecent broadcasting under two separate statutes: 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication[s], '74 and 47 U.S.C. §
303(g), which requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest.
' 7
1
A. Enter the "Satiric Humorist" George Carlin
Just as in Burstyn v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court was
once again confronted with an alleged violation of an administrative
rule-this time the October 30, 1973, broadcast of the now-famous
12-minute monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," by the American
satirist and humorist George Carlin.76
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,
the United States Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:
"whether the Federal Communications Commission has any power to
regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene."7 7
71. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 731 n.2 (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 97).
72. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a), 312(b), 503(b)(1)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
73. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(c)(1), 308(b) (2006).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
75. Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934 provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires, shall... generally encourage the larger and more effective
use of radio in the public interest."




Pursuant to a complaint received from a radio listener about the
broadcast, on February 21, 1975, the FCC issued a declaratory order
determining that Pacifica "could have been the subject of
administrative sanctions. While the Commission did not impose
formal sanctions against Pacifica, it stated that "the order would be
associated with the station's license file, and in the event that
subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide
whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been
granted by Congress., 79  The Commission sought to utilize the
controversy surrounding Carlin's monologue as an opportunity to
"'clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering' the
growing number of complaints about indecent speech on the
airwaves.""
Although the Commission refused to characterize the language as
"necessarily obscene," it stated that it was nevertheless "patently
offensive., 81 Interestingly, the Commission expressed the view that
such language would best be regulated by:
[P]rinciples analogous to those found in the law of nuisance
where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior more
than actually prohibiting it.... [The] concept of 'indecent' is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to
language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience."82
"In summary, the Commission stated: 'We therefore hold that the
language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §
1464.'..
78. Id. at 730 (citing 56 F.C.C.2D at 99).
79. Id. (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 99).
80. Id. at 731 (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 94).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 731-32 (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 98). As footnote five of the case indicates, if a
broadcast was deemed not to be obscene, but rather indecent-presumably because it
contained some "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"-and was preceded by an
effective warning, such a broadcast might not be deemed indecent if broadcast in the late
evening, but would be so if broadcast during the day, when children would presumably be
in the audience. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732 n.5 (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 98).
83. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732 (citing 56 F.C.C.2d at 99). The decision of the
Commission was not unanimous and betrayed a wide divergence of opinion on the issue of
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After the Commission issued its order, it was asked to further
clarify its opinion by issuing a ruling that the broadcast of indecent
words as a part of a live newscast would not be prohibited.' In
response, the Commission issued another opinion in which it stated
that it "never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the
broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to




The Commission, however, refused to go any further, citing its "long
standing policy of refusing to issue interpretive rulings or advisory
opinions when the critical facts are not explicitly stated or there is a
possibility that subsequent events will alter them" and declining to
comment on various hypothetical situations presented in the
petition.
6
B. A Procedural Fragment and Quagmire in the DC Circuit?
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the FCC, with each of the three judges (Chief Judge
Bazelon, and Judges Tamm and Leventhal) writing separate
opinions.87 Judge Tamm concluded that the order represented
censorship' which is expressly forbidden by section 326 of the
Communications Act.8 9 In the alternative, Judge Tamm read the
the relationship of obscenity and indecency-a divergence that would carry through to the
entire appellate process. Pacifica Found. Station, 56 F.C.C.2d 94. For example: Chairman
Wiley concurred in the result without joining the opinion. Id. at 94. Commissioners Reid
and Quello filed separate statements expressing their opinion that the language was
inappropriate for broadcast at any time. Id. at 102-03. Commissioner Robinson was
joined by Commissioner Hooks in filing a concurrent statement expressing the opinion
that:
[W]e can regulate offensive speech to the extent it constitutes a public
nuisance.... The governing idea is that "indecency" is not an inherent
attribute of words themselves; it is rather a matter of context and
conduct.... If I were called upon to do so, I would find that Carlin's
monologue, if it were broadcast at an appropriate hour and accompanied
by suitable warning, was distinguished by sufficient literary value to avoid
being "indecent" within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added).
84. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 732.
85. Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976). As found in the FCC's opinion, the
use of the word "channel" may fairly be interpreted to mean "restrict."
86. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 733 (citing 59 F.C.C.2d at 893).
87. Pacifica Foundation v. EC.C., 556 F.2d 9 (1977).
88. Id. at 13.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006). Section 326 provides:
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Commission's opinion as the equivalent of an administrative rule and
concluded that it was "overbroad."'  While Chief Judge Bazelon
concurred in the result, he was persuaded that the prohibition against
censorship found in section 326 was inapplicable to broadcasts that
were expressly prohibited by section 1464 (which forbad the use of
any "obscene, indecent, or profane language"). 9' Judge Bazelon
concluded, however, that section 1464 must be "narrowly construed
to cover only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by
the First Amendment."' Judge Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the
only issue was whether the Commission could regulate the language
"as broadcast." 93 Judge Leventhal emphasized the societal interest in
protecting children, "not only from exposure to indecent language,
but also from exposure to the idea that such language has official
approval.,94 Judge Leventhal concluded that the FCC had "correctly
condemned the daytime broadcast as indecent." 95
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 96  The
Supreme Court extrapolated four questions that would encompass
their review:
(1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more
than the Commission's determination that the monologue was
indecent "as broadcast"; (2) whether the Commission's order
was a form of censorship forbidden by § 326 [of the
Communications Act]; (3) whether the broadcast was
indecent within the meaning of § 1464; and (4) whether the
order violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
90. Pacifica Found. v. F C.C., 556 F.2d at 17.
91. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
92. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 733-34 (citing 556 F.2d at 24-30).
93. Pacifica Found. v. F.C.C., 556 F.2d at 30.
94. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 734 (citing 556 F.2d at 37).
95. Id.
96. FC.C. v. Pacifica Found., 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
97. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 734.
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C. The Supreme Court Weighs In
In answering these questions, the United States Supreme Court
stated that it would review section 326 as it related to the issue of
censorship and consider whether speech that is concededly not
obscene may nonetheless be restricted as "indecent" under the
authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.9 Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1929,
the precursor to section 326 of the Communications Act, contained
important provisions dealing both with a prohibition against
censorship, a pre-broadcast power, and a prohibition against the
utterance of "obscene, indecent, or profane language" reviewable
post-broadcast by the then Federal Radio Commission." Section 29
reads as follows:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to
give the licensing authority the power of censorship over the
radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio
station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communications.
No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication.1"
This provision against censorship thus "unequivocally denies the
Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to
excise materials considered inappropriate for the airwaves." 1
However, the Court also added that the same prohibition against
prior censorship has "never been construed to deny the Commission
the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the
performance of its regulatory duties."1 2  This was the same
construction placed on the relevant provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 by which courts and the Federal Radio
Commission held that section 29 deprived the Commission of the
power to subject the "broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its
release," but concluded that the Commission had the "'undoubted
right' to take note of past program content when considering a
98. Id. at 735.
99. Radio Act, ch. 169, § 29, 44 STAT. 1162, 1173 (1927) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 326).
100. Id. at 1172-73.
101. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 735.
102. Id.
2009]
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licensee's renewal application. "'03 The successor to the Federal Radio
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, has accepted
this interpretation."
Thus, the Court concluded that section 326 did not limit the
Commission's authority to impose sanctions post-broadcast on
licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. 5
Having decided this threshold question, the Supreme Court
addressed the question in the case at hand: whether the afternoon
broadcast of the "Filthy Words" monologue was in fact indecent
within the meaning of section 1464 of the Act.' °6
1. Was the "Filthy Words" Monologue Indecent or Merely Satire? Or
Perhaps Both?
The Commission specifically identified several words in the
monologue that referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs,
and stated that the repetitive and deliberate use of those words in an
afternoon broadcast when children were in the audience was patently
offensive. °7 On this basis, the Commission held that the broadcast
was indecent.'O° While Pacifica did not quarrel with the Commission's
conclusion that the afternoon broadcast was patently offensive,
Pacifica objected to the Commission's definition of indecency and
argued that the broadcast was not indecent because it lacked a
prurient appeal.'O°
The Supreme Court rejected this contention, relying on the "plain
language" of the statute; that is, the Court noted that the words
"'obscene, indecent, or profane' are written in the disjunctive," with
103. Id. at 736 (citing KFKB Broad. Assn. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672
(1931)). In KFKB Broad. Assn., the Circuit Court held that there had been no attempt on
the part of the commission to engage in any prior censorship. 47 F.2d at 672. Rather, "In
considering the question whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be
served by a renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely exercised its
undoubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which is not censorship." Id.
(emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169 (1968)
(Wright, J., concurring) (pointing out that the Commission is not prohibited from
canceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of improper programming
by allowing "course, vulgar, suggestive, double-meaning" programming). Id. at 173 n.3
(citations omitted).
105. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738.
106. Id. at 738-39.
107. Id. at 739.
108. Id.
109. Id.
each word having a separate and distinct meaning.1 ' The Court
noted that the concept of "prurient interest" or "prurience" is an
element of its obscenity jurisprudence, while the "normal definition of
'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards
of morality."'' . Relying on prior decisions and the language and
history of section 1464, the Supreme Court rejected Pacifica's
contention that prurience was an essential component of indecent
language, and the Court concluded that "there is no basis for
disagreeing with the Commission's conclusion that indecent language
was used in this broadcast."
112
2. The Constitutional Attack
Pacifica raised two core constitutional issues in attacking the
Commission's order. First, Pacifica argued that the Commission's
construction of the statutory language "broadly encompasses so much
constitutionally protected speech that reversal is required even if
Pacifica's broadcast.., is not itself protected by the First
Amendment.""' 3  Second, Pacifica asserted in broad terms that
inasmuch as the recording was not obscene, the Constitution "forbids
any abridgement of the right to broadcast it on the radio.""1
4
The Supreme Court rejected the first contention."5  The Court
noted that the Commission's "order was 'issued in a specific factual
context, ' ' ' 1 6 and approved this approach, "for indecency is largely a
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the
abstract."" 7  The Court noted that while it might be true that the
Commission's order may lead some broadcasters to impose self-
110. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739-40.
111. Id. at 740. The case provided a definition of the term indecent from Webster's
Dictionary: "a: altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or what
circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable:
UNSEEMLY ... b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: .... " Id.
at 740 n.14. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 802 (1991).
The Court noted that in a related area-determining the validity of Section 1461 on the
ground of a vagueness attack-the Supreme Court followed the holding of Manual Enters.
v. Day. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 740. There, Justice Harlan
wrote that the phrase "'obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,' taken as a whole,
was clearly limited to the obscene." Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 740 (citing Manual
Enters., 370 U.S. at 483).
112. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 741.
113. Id. at 742.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing 59 F.C.C.2d at 893).
117. Id.
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censorship, "[i]nvalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical
application to situations not before this Court is 'strong medicine' to
be applied 'sparingly and only as a last resort.""'18  The Court
concluded: "We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the
vigor of patently offensive sexual and excretory speech.""' 9
The second question proved to be more vexing. It was clearly a
frontal assault on the power of the government, through the FCC, in
non-obscenity cases. Namely, the Court was asked to address the
question: "whether the First Amendment denies government any power
to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language in any
circumstances."120  The Supreme Court conceded the obvious: The
words in the Carlin monologue were unquestionably "speech" within
the meaning of the First Amendment. 2' The Court also noted that
the Commission's objections to the broadcast of the Carlin
monologue were based in part on its content.12 Pacifica asserted that
the First Amendment prohibits all governmental regulation that
depends on the content of speech.'23
The Supreme Court rejected the imposition of such an absolute
rule. 124  The Court engaged in an exhaustive First Amendment
analysis of the issues of both content and context in light of the
question whether a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with
sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content.'25 The
118. Id. at 743 (quoting Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (holding that
a statute, which gives adequate warning of what activities it proscribes and sets forth
explicit standards for those who must apply it, is not impermissibly vague)).
119. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743. The Commission had commented quite strongly
about the harmful societal effects of the language found in the Carlin monologue, stating:
"Obnoxious, gutter language describing these matters has the effect of debasing and
brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions...." 56 F.C.C.
2d at 98. Conceding that the monologue presents a point of view-attempting to show
that the words it uses are "harmless" and that attitudes towards them are "essentially
silly"-the Supreme Court nonetheless concurred with the Commission's view that had
branded the monologue as indecent and stated, "[o]ur society has a tradition of
performing certain bodily functions in private, and of severely limiting the public exposure
or discussion of such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are
offensive irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure." Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. at 746 n.23.





125. Included in this contextual review is the oft-repeated formulation of Justice
Holmes for the Court in Schenck v. United States:
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Court noted that "obscene materials have been denied the protection
of the First Amendment because their content is so offensive to
contemporary moral standards."1 26 However, the Court made it clear:
[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a
reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. If there
were any reason to believe that the Commission's
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could
be traced to its political content-or even to the fact that it
satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words-
First Amendment protection might be required. But that is
simply not this case. These words offend for the same reasons
that obscenity offends.127
The Supreme Court then turned its attention to what has been
termed the hierarchy of First Amendment values."1  Conceding that
words such as those found in the Carlin monologue, although
ordinarily lacking in literary, political, or scientific value, might not be
entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment, the Court
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have
all the effect of force.... The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 744-45 (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). See also
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977) (paying heed to "'commonsense differences' between commercial speech
and other varieties" and noting that the government may strictly regulate truthfulness in
commercial speech); Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (treating libel actions
against private citizens more severely than libel against public officials); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (wholly prohibiting obscenity); Young v. Am. Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52, 96 (1976) (refusing to hold that a "statutory classification is
unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication protected by the
First Amendment.").
126. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957)).
127. Id. at 745-46.
128. Id. at 746.
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stated that the constitutional protection accorded to such a
communication containing "such patently offensive sexual and
excretory language need not be the same in every context."'' 9
Thus, the Supreme Court found that the content of Pacifica's
broadcast of the Carlin monologue was "vulgar," "offensive," and
"shocking."' Further, the Court stated that such content was not
entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all
circumstances. 31  The Court then turned to the remaining
constitutional question. The Court would consider the context of the
broadcast "in order to determine whether the Commission's action was
constitutionally permissible."'32
3. Context Provides a Clue to Supreme Court Analysis: The Media as
Intruder
The Court turned to the question of context by citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the object of detailed analysis in Part II of the
article, noting that the Court has "long recognized that each medium
of expression presents special First Amendment problems."'
13
Recognizing the unique nature of radio communications, 3 1 the
Supreme Court enunciated two important distinctions that had
special relevance in deciding the remaining constitutional question.1
First, the Supreme Court recognized the obvious-that broadcast
media as a whole has established a "uniquely pervasive presence" in
the lives of all Americans. 36 The Court then raised an interesting
perspective. In this context, "[p]atently offensive, indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder."'3 7 Because the listener is constantly tuning in and out of
broadcasts, it is unrealistic to think that a prior warning relating to
129. Id. at 746-47.
130. Id. at 747.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 747-48.
133. Id. at 748 (citing Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502-03).
134. Unlike other "speakers," the Court noted that a broadcaster might be deprived of
a license if the Commission decided that such an action would serve "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity." Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)).
135. Id. at 748-50.
136. Id. at 748.
137. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
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potential offensive content could completely protect the listener from
any unexpected offensive content.
118
Second, because broadcasts are "uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read.... Pacifica's broadcast could have
enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant."' 39  Thus, while other
forms of offensive expressions may be off-limits to minors (for
example, excluding those under eighteen from "adult" bookstores
and certain motion picture theaters) without restricting the
expression "at its source"-i.e., the book or the film itself-the same
is not true for the radio.' The Court noted that adults who desire to
purchase tapes and records or to view films or go to nightclubs to
hear the kind of words found in the Carlin monologue may continue
to do so.' Indeed, the Commission made it clear that it had not
''unequivocally" prohibited broadcasts from containing the kind of
speech found in the Carlin monologue, stating that it had not formally
considered the separate question whether the broadcast might be
appropriate for a late-night audience where the audience would
contain few children.'42 Accordingly, "the ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns
recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting."
143
In sum, the Court stated that its ruling would be a narrow one,
resting substantially on a "nuisance rationale under which context is
138. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49. The Court did note that "[o]utside the home,
the balance between the offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes tip
in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended listener to turn away." Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. at 749 n.27 (citation omitted). However, the Court has also noted:
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in
many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the
public dialogue ... we have at the same time consistently stressed that
we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749 n.27 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
139. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749. The Court had noted in Ginsberg v. New York
that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents'
claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
140. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749.
141. Id. at 750 n.28.
142. Id. at 750 & n.28.
143. Id. at 750.
2009]
66 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [32:1
all-important."'' The variables cited by the Court included the time
of day of the broadcast, the content of the program in which the
language was used, the composition of the audience, and the
differences between radio, television, and "perhaps closed-circuit
transmissions."
1 45
Interestingly, the Court concluded with a reference to Justice
Southerland's opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' in which he
wrote: "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."'' 47 The Court in
Pacifica summarized: "We simply hold that when the Commission
finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."'
148
IV. The New Media: The Internet and the First Amendment
What, then, are the lessons of Burstyn and Pacifica Foundation
that might prove helpful, and perhaps critical, in an analysis of the
rules applicable to the Internet?'4 9 Enter the Attorney General Janet
Reno (at least, by name), or rather the Congress of the United States!
The primary purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
to reduce regulation and encourage the "rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." 50 The Act includes seven Titles,
six of which were the product of extensive committee hearings and
the subject of a great deal of debate and discussion in Reports
prepared by the various Committees of Jurisdiction of both the
United States Senate and House of Representatives. However,
Title V, known as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996"
("CDA"), contained provisions that were added to the legislation
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
147. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750-51 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388).
148. Id.
149. For a discussion of the history and origins of the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844,849-50 (1997).
150. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). As
reported by the Museum of Broadcast Communications: "The Telecommunications Act of
1996 is a complex reform of American communication policymaking that attempts to
provide similar ground rules and a level playing field in virtually all sectors of the
communications industries." U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, http://www.
museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/uspolicyt/uspolicyt.htm. The Act's provisions fall into
the following general areas: radio and television broadcasting, cable television and
telephone services, Internet and on-line computer services, and telecommunications
equipment manufacturing. Id.
151. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858.
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either after the committee hearings concluded or as amendments
offered during the floor debate on the legislation.52 An amendment
offered in the United States Senate was the source of two statutory
provisions enacted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently
offensive" communications on the Internet.
53
The first provision, section 223(a), prohibits the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under
18 years of age.' It provides:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications.., by
means of a telecommunications device knowingly makes,
creates, or solicits, and initiates the transmission of, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that
the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age,
regardless of whether the maker of such communication
placed the call or initiated the communication [or] knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under his control to
be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.'55
The second provision of the Telecommunications Act, section
223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently
offensive messages in a manner that would be available to a person
under 18 years of age.'56 Section 223(d) provides:
Whoever in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
uses any interactive computer service to display to send to a
specific person or persons under 18 years of age, [or] uses any
interactive computer service to display in a manner available
152. Id. See also 141 Cong. Rec. S8087-04 (June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon)
(amendment proposed by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) in an effort to make the internet
"superhighway a safe place for our... families to travel on.").
153. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858-59. The Supreme Court, as well as the District Court,
considered the two provisions as one for purposes of evaluation and analysis. Id. at 859
n.25. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Kurt E. Wimmer & Cara E.
Maggioni, Congress and the Expansion of Communications Technology, in THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS
1934-1996 195-99 (Max D. Paglin ed., Pike and Fischer, Inc. 1999).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2006).
155. Id.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
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to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in
context, depicts or describes in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user
of such service placed the call or initiated the
communications; or knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.'57
Although these provisions are comprehensive and seemingly
dispositive, they were subject to two affirmative defenses. The first
defense dealt with individuals who take "good faith, reasonable,
effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict access to minors to the
prohibited communications. 5 8 The second defense covered those
individuals who restricted access to the prohibited materials by
requiring certain designated forms of proof of age, such as "requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number.'"9
In a review of the constitutionality of section 223(a) and section
223(d), the Supreme Court held that "[n]otwithstanding the
legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting
children from harmful materials," it concurred with the three-judge
panel of the District Court that the statute abridged "the 'freedom of
speech' protected by the First Amendment." 60
In considering the case, the Supreme Court announced that it
would pass upon the constitutionality of the CDA by analyzing three
cases: Ginsberg v. New York,' 6' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 62-two
cases that have been featured prominently in the analysis found in
Parts II and III-and, interestingly, Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,
essentially a "property" case involving a municipal zoning ordinance
that was designed to keep "adult" movie theaters out of residential
neighborhoods. 163
157. Id.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A).
159. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B).
160. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
161. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
162. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
163. 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986).
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A. Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation Summary and Redux
In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court dealt squarely with the "age"
issue and held that a New York statute, prohibiting the sale to minors
of materials deemed obscene as to them but not if sold to adults, was
constitutional.16'  The Court specifically rejected the defendant's
contention that "the scope of the constitutional freedom of
expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned with
sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or
a minor."1 65 The Court based its decision on the State's fundamental
interest in the well-being of its youth (presumably under the age of
18),'" and a recognition of the core principle that "parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our society.
' 67
However, the Court distinguished Reno from Ginsberg in four
important ways. First, in Ginsberg, the "prohibition against sales to
minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the
magazines for their children."'68 In contrast, under the CDA, neither
164. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 (noting that the "girlie picture magazines involved
in the sales here are not obscene for adults."). See also Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
165. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
166. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). There, the Supreme
Court noted that "[t]he Court has long recognized that the Government has a compelling
interest in protecting our Nation's children." Id. at 263. See also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57, 774 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part (distinguishing child pornography from other sexually explicit speech
because of the State's interest in protecting the children exploited by the production
process of pornography)).
While in general, pornography can be banned only if it is judged to be obscene,
under Ferber, pornography showing or depicting minors can be proscribed whether or not
the images are considered obscene under the definition as set forth in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA) abridged the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. 535 U.S. at
239-40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260A (2006 & Supp. 2008). The Supreme Court framed
the question as follows: "whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a
significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography
under Ferber." Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240. The statute involved what the Court
noted was "the new technology," and extended the federal prohibition against child
pornography to sexually explicit images that appeared to depict minors but were, in
reality, produced without using any real children. Id. at 239-41. These images-
sometimes called "Cyber Porn"-were created by using adults who look like or appear to
be minors or by using the technology of computer imaging. Id. at 239-40. The Supreme
Court ruled that the CPPA was "inconsistent with Miller and finds no support in Ferber,"
and that Sections 2256(8)(b) and 2256(8)(d) of the CPPA were both overbroad and
unconstitutional. Id. at 256.
167. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639).
168. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
20091
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
the consent of the parents nor their participation in the
communication would "avoid the application of the statute."1 69
Second, while the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg applied only
to commercial transactions,"' the CDA contains no such limitation.
Third, the New York statute coupled a definition of material that is
"harmful to minors" with a requirement that the material be "utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors."' 7' However, the
CDA failed to provide in section 223(a)(1) any definition of the term
"indecent," and section 223(d) also omitted any requirement that the
"patently offensive" material lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.12 Fourth, under the New York statute, a minor is a
person under the age of 17, whereas under the CDA, the statute
applies to all those under 18 years.1
73
In Pacifica Foundation, the FCC asserted that the repetitive use
of certain words that referred to excretory and sexual activities or
organs "in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience
was patently offensive" and concluded that the monologue was
indecent.17 The Supreme Court agreed, rejecting two constitutional
attacks that Pacifica Foundation made on the Commission's
authority: that the Commission's construction of its authority was
"overly broad," and Pacifica Foundation's assertion that since the
recording itself was not judged to be obscene, the First Amendment
forbade any abridgement of the right to broadcast the monologue on
the radio.'75
In response, the Court observed that the First Amendment does
not prohibit all government regulation of the content of speech.'76 As
a result, the "availability of constitutional protection for a vulgar and
offensive monologue that was not obscene depended on the context
of the broadcast."'77 The Court further noted that "[o]f all forms of
communication," broadcasting has received the most limited First
169. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
170. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 647.
171. Id. at 646.
172. Reno, 521 U.S. at 859 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 863, 871 (E.D. Pa.
1996)). Judge Buchwalter concluded that the words "patently offensive" were so vague
that enforcement would violate the "fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple
fairness." ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 861.
173. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
174. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739.
175. Id. at 742.
176. Id. at 742-43.
177. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (citing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 744-48).
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Amendment protection.' This is because "the ease with which
children may obtain access to broadcasts, 'coupled with the concerns
recognized in Ginsberg,' justifie[s] the special treatment afforded
indecent broadcasting." 1
79
Once again, the Court outlined the differences between the order
upheld in Pacifica Foundation and the CDA. First, the order issued
by the FCC in Pacifica Foundation targeted a specific broadcast,
which, as the Supreme Court noted directly, represented "a rather
dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to
designate when-rather than whether-it would be permissible to air
such a program in that particular medium. ' S" Second, the CDA
contained broad categorical prohibitions that were not limited to
particular times and were not subject to the independent evaluation
of an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.'
And third, unlike the CDA, the Commission's order in Pacifica
Foundation was not punitive."
The Court recognized that the medium of radio was unique in
that warnings could not "adequately protect the listener from
unexpected program content."' 83 In contrast, the Internet posed a
more "remote" threat because there were a series of affirmative steps
is required in order to access specific materials.'
The Supreme Court then interestingly introduced a third case into
its review-Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 85  In Renton, a city
zoning ordinance limited "adult entertainment" establishments [adult
movie theaters] to one corner of the city constituting less than 5
percent of the city's total area.' The Supreme Court concluded that
the ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films shown in the
theaters, but rather at what the Court characterized as the "secondary
effects"-such as crime and deteriorating property values-that the
presence of these theaters seemed to accompany, if not spur.181
178. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748.
179. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-67 (citing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50).
180. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867. However, see infra Section V.




185. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
186. Id. at 53.
187. Id. at 48-49 (stating "[it] is [the] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances
attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech[.]" Id. at 49 (quoting Young
v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (upholding Detroit's "Anti-
Skid Row" ordinances prohibiting adult motion picture theaters and adult book stores
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Once again, the Court differentiated Renton from its
consideration of the CDA on three separate grounds. First, while the
government chose to characterize its actions under the CDA as a sort
of "cyberzoning" on the Internet, the Supreme Court noted that the





Second, the CDA was designed to protect certain minors from the
primary effects of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather
than any "secondary" effects of such speech.8 9 And third, the CDA is
a "content-based blanket restriction on speech," and thus, cannot be
analyzed as a traditional form of more limited "time, place, and
manner regulation." 90
Based upon a careful review of these three foundational cases, the
Supreme Court concluded that that their precedents did not require
the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the CDA.19'
B. The Supreme Court Moves to Its Analysis
In its detailed analysis, the Supreme Court first outlined the
distinct differences between regulating more traditional forms of the
media and regulating the Internet, including: the history of extensive
government regulation of the broadcast medium," the scarcity of
available frequencies, 93 and the "invasive nature" of the broadcast
media.94 The Court noted that these factors were not present in
cyberspace.195  In fact, the District Court specifically found that
"[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's
home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom
encounter content 'by accident."" 96  The District Court also
specifically found that "'[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are
preceded by warnings as to the content,' and cited testimony that
located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses," including theaters, book
stores, liquor stores, pool halls, pawnshops, "and the like")). Young also provides a
definition of an "adult motion picture theater" as one "presenting material distinguished
or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified
Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas' ....... and "adult book store" in
substantially the same terms. 427 U.S. at 54 n.5.
188. Reno, 521 U.S. at 867-68.
189. Id. at 868.
190. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46).
191. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 869 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding
88). The District Court made 123 specific findings of facts.
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'odds are slim' that a user would come across a sexually explicit sight
by accident."1"
The Supreme Court then focused on an interesting case, Sable
Communications of California v. Federal Communications
Commission,198 involving what is commonly known as "dial-a-porn. '99
Sable Communications involved a challenge to an amendment to the
Communications Act that imposed a blanket prohibition on both
indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.
The Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional insofar as
it applied to "obscene" messages but was unconstitutional as it was
applied to "indecent" messages.20 1
In arguing for the constitutionality of the amendment to the
Communications Act in Sable Communications, the Government
relied on the rationale of Pacifica Foundation and asserted that the
ban was necessary to prevent children from gaining access to these
types of messages. 2°2 Reflecting the view that protections of the First
Amendment are not absolute and that special considerations might
apply in cases of minors, the United States Supreme Court agreed
and reiterated the foundational premise that "there is a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors" which could be extended to shielding minors from indecent
messages that might not be judged to be obscene by adult
standards.2 3 However, the Court once again distinguished Reno v.
ACLU from Pacifica Foundation on two now-familiar grounds:
Pacifica Foundation did not involve a complete ban on the
communication and it involved a different medium of
communication." The Court in Sable Communications explained
that "the dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps
to receive the communication. '"2' 5 The Court added, "[p]lacing a
telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken
by surprise by an indecent message.""
197. Reno, 521 U.S. 869 (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845 (finding 88)).
198. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
199. Id. at 128.
200. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 128).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126).
204. Id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127).
205. Id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28).
206. Id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 128). Is this rationale still valid? Because of the
rapid pace of technological change, issues presented by the existence of "Spy-Ware" or
other invasive technologies might cause an unwanted image to literally "pop-up" on a
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Although Reno v. ACLU is dated-note that it was decided in
1997 and mainly involved a "dial-up" phone service-it is most
instructive that even at the early date in the development of the
Internet, the Supreme Court in Reno seemed quite prescient in
asserting that:
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication [the
Internet] includes not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time
dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer. 207
The Court in Reno reasoned that, because of the unique nature of the
Internet, with "the content on the Internet [] as diverse as human
thought,"28 there was no basis for "qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny" as applied to other media.2
C. Are Legal and Definitional Ambiguities and Constitutional Burdens
Endemic to the Proposed Regulation of the Internet?
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court first focused on the
allegations of vagueness and ambiguity in the CDA, noting that this
"uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been
carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials."' 0 Vagueness is considered to be a
computer, without the concurrence or actions of the computer operator-and certainly,
without the knowledge or consent of parents!
207. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
208. Id. (citing 929 F. Supp. at 842).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 871-72 (distinguishing Reno v. ACLU from Miller on grounds that Miller
contained a requirement that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the
applicable state law;" that the Miller definition was limited to "sexual conduct," whereas
the CDA extends its reach also to include (1) "excretory activities" as well as (2) "organs"
of both a sexual and excretory nature; and that Reno v. ACLU lacks reference to the
additional prongs in Miller-(1) that, taken as a whole, the material appeal to the
"prurient" interest, and (2) that it 'lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."). The Supreme Court specifically rejected the government's contention that
"material having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily
fall outside the CDA's 'patently offensive' and 'indecent' prohibitions." See id. at 871
n.37. The Court also rejected the Government's contention that (1) the CDA is
constitutional because it "leaves open ample 'alternative channels' of communication;"
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matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is clearly
content-based regulation on speech, and in this context, it presents an
obvious "chilling effect on free speech., 21' Second, the CDA is a
criminal statute, threatening offenders with penalties, including up to
two years in prison for each potential act in violation.1 2 As to the
issue of the imposition of criminal penalties, the Supreme Court
noted that an increased deterrent effect, which might cause speakers
to remain silent on a variety of topics 213 rather than to communicate
"even arguably unlawful words," coupled with the "risk of
discriminatory enforcement" of vague and ambiguous regulations,
''poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by
civil regulation ....
The Supreme Court discussed the requirement that a statute
which regulates the content of speech must exhibit precision and must
be targeted towards a clearly defined group (presumably minors) that
requires special protection of the courts, lest the government
"reduc[e] the adult population... to... only what is fit for
children., 21' The Court concluded that:
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech,
the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address one
another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted
216to serve.
In addition, the Supreme Court addressed the requirement that a
statute must be "narrowly tailored" in order to avoid an "over-
arching commitment" to an improper regulation of free speech. 17
The Court rejected the government's contention that prohibiting a
transmission whenever one of its recipients is a minor would not
and (2) that the "plain meaning of the 'knowledge' and 'specific person' requirements of
the CDA significantly restricts its permissible applications." Id. at 879.
211. Id. at 871-72. See also, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
212. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872.
213. Interestingly, the Supreme Court provided a partial listing of topics that might
provoke adverse action under the CDA: a serious discussion about birth control,
homosexuality, or the consequences of prison rape. Id. at 824.
214. Id. at 872.
215. Id. at 875.
216. Id. at 874.
217. Id. at 876.
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interfere with protected adult-to-adult communication."8 Because of
the myriad of ways that individuals can access the Internet-the
Court cited e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, and chat rooms-the
District Court had found that, at the time of the trial, there was no
existing technology that might prevent a minor from obtaining access
to Internet communications without denying access to these same
communications to an adult.1 9
The Court also commented that the "breadth of the CDA's
coverage is wholly unprecedented.""22 "Unlike the regulations [that
were] upheld in [both] Ginsberg and Pacifica [Foundation], the scope
of the CDA was not limited to commercial speech or commercial
entities., 22' The Court commented:
Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on
their own computers in the presence of minors. The general,
undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" cover
large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious
educational or other value. Moreover, the "community
standards" criterion as applied to the Internet means that any
communication available to a nation-wide audience will be
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be
offended by the message.222
Because the statute posed a content-based restriction on speech,
the government faced a heavy burden to explain why a less restrictive
provision would not be as effective in protecting minors from harmful
materials. 223 The Supreme Court concluded that the government had
not done so.224 The Court also noted that there were many possible
alternatives to the impermissible reaches of the CDA, including
"tagging" of indecent materials so that parental control of materials
coming into the home could be effected, making exceptions for
messages with legitimate artistic or educational (medical) value,
providing avenues for parental choice and decision, and even the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 877.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 877-78 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993)).
223. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.
224. Id.
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possibility of regulating commercial websites in a different manner
than non-commercial chat rooms.
25
In seemingly rebuking Congress, the Supreme Court addressed
the lack of any detailed findings by Congress, or the absence of any
Congressional hearings addressing "the special problems" of the
CDA.226  The Supreme Court stated: "We are persuaded that the
CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at
all., 27  As an effective summary, the Court added: "[The CDA]
would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a 'heckler's
veto,' upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on
and inform the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child-a
'specific person ... under 18 years of age'-would be present. ' ' 228
D. What About the Affirmative Defenses? Might These "Save the CDA"?
The government mounted a two-pronged-some might say, a
"last gasp"-argument in defense of the CDA, focusing on the
defenses provided in section 223(e)(5).229  Under the first defense,
termed the "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions" provision, the government contends that "tagging" provides
an effective defense that "saves the constitutionality of the Act.,
231
However, the government conceded that, at the time the case was
heard, no such technology was present or generally available, raising
strong doubts as to the "effective" argument.2 1  A second defense
centered around Section 223(e)(5)(B), namely the "verification
defense," under which the transmitter has restricted access to the
objectionable communication by requiring "the use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or an adult personal
identification number., 232 As opposed to "tagging," this technology
was, in fact, available in 1997.233 However, while technologically
feasible, the District Court had found that it was not economically




228. Id. at 880 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(a)).
229. Id. at 881.
230. Id. The "tagging defense" is based on the technology that transmitters may
encode their indecent communications such that would indicate their objectionable
content, thus permitting the receiving party (presumably parents or other adults) to block
their reception with appropriate computer software.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 881, 861 n.26.
233. Id. at 881.
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forms of verification.2M In addition, the Supreme Court noted there
still might be a problem with a minor "posing" as an adult-and the
technology would not be an effective remedy against this possibility.23'
Thus, the District Court refused to rely on an unproven future
technology or upon an unrealistic and unenforceable remedy. 16 The
government had failed to prove that the defenses available under
section 223(e)(5) would "significantly reduce the heavy burden on
adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays.23' 7
E. The Decision
Interestingly, the government raised an additional reason for
upholding the constitutionality of the CDA that had not been raised
at the District Court level, namely that, in addition to protecting
children, it had an "'equally significant' interest in fostering the
growth of the Internet...., 23 The Court characterized this interest
as an assumption that the "unregulated availability of potentially
'indecent' and 'patently offensive' material on the Internet might
drive countless citizens away from the medium because the risk of
exposing themselves or their children to harmful material.,
239
This defense, which might be called the "Internet Abstinence"
defense, was found to be unpersuasive by the Court.24° The Court
noted: "The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas
contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record indicates
that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be
phenomenal.
2 41
In its conclusion, the Court used rather forceful language to
reaffirm its basic belief in the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed to Americans under the First Amendment-especially in
light of the development of the new and exciting technology
embodied in the Internet:
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
234. Id.
235. Id. at 882.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 882.
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with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic
society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship.
24 2
V. Law and Technology after Reno v. ACLU
The role of the United States Supreme Court in mediating
controversies in the arena of the media has been pivotal in striking
the "delicate balance" between societal interests, parental concerns,
and personal freedom. As can be seen, the attempt to reconcile these
often competing interests has posed a difficult problem.
The three cases highlighted thus far in this study, Burstyn v.
Wilson, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, and Reno v. ACLU, demonstrate
how the United States Supreme Court has drawn important
distinctions based on the unique factual circumstances of each case.
Yet, all have been the object of significant societal debate and
sometimes sharp division within the Court itself at the time the cases
were decided. A brief summary review is in order.
Burstyn demonstrates how the power of the state to limit
speech-in this case, a controversial film seen as offensive to the
politically powerful Roman Catholic Church and its scion, Francis
Cardinal Spellman-based upon a finding that the film was
"sacrilegious," had crossed the line of permissible state action."3
Thus, the decision of the New York Board of Regents, a state
administrative body, was struck down on constitutional (First
Amendment) and due process (Fourteenth Amendment) grounds.2"
In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court immersed itself into
what today might be called the "culture wars," by upholding a
determination of a federal administrative agency (the FCC) that
certain words, which while suitable (constitutionally) for adult-
hearing, were not suitable-and were thus not constitutionally
protected-for broadcast to minors.245 In this case, the medium was
the radio.2"
Finally, in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court once again was
called upon to draw a "bright line" of sorts. Distinguishing the
242. Id.
243. See supra Part II.
244. Id.
245. See supra Part III.
246. Id.
2009]
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factual circumstances and the constitutional principles from Pacifica
Foundation-where the Supreme Court had found that the presence
of the radio was truly pervasive, with the offensive words of the
Carlin monologue literally invading an individual's privacy-the
Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU found that the Internet was indeed
a very different medium from the radio.247 Thus, the protections of
the First Amendment were of special import when considering
attempts by the state to regulate its content.
In striking down a federal statute that attempted to ban indecent
"messages" that had not been deemed to be obscene, the United
States Supreme Court relied upon the rationale that through
technology, parents could effectively control the contents of messages
coming into their homes.4 8 Because of its unique structure and
pervasive importance, the Internet was entitled to special protection
from government intervention and censorship. 249 As the District
Court found, "[t]he content of the Internet is as diverse as human
thought., 250  As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that its
precedents provided "no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.,
251
But, was the Supreme Court correct? Would facts prove that the
Supreme Court itself did not understand the true nature of the
"Internet phenomenon?" Can parents or other adults be guaranteed
that they will have effective control over what comes into their
homes, thereby alleviating the necessity or rationale for government
intervention? Would the same principles and distinctions apply to
Congress' attempt to restrict a minor's access to view "objectionable
websites" or to be protected from "harmful images" found on a
computer when accessing the Internet in a public library?
On one issue, the Supreme Court certainly "got it right." In Reno
v. ACLU, the Court stated that the Internet could hardly be
considered a "scarce expressive commodity., 252 The Supreme Court
noted that the Internet provides "relatively unlimited, low-cost
capacity for communication of all kinds., 213 In 1997, the government
had estimated that "[a]s many as 40 million people [in the United
247. See supra Part IV.B.
248. See supra Part IV.C-E.
249. See supra Part IV.E.
250. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
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States] use the Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to
200 million by 1999.,,254 To properly contextualize the previous
statement, world Internet users have grown from 360,985,492 in
December 2000 to 1,668,870,408 in June 2009, more than quadrupling
over an eight-year period."' It was certainly true, as the District
Court found that "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.
,25 6
A. Congress Again Acts
We now turn to congressional actions in response to Reno v.
ACLU. We do so, because in the case of both statutes, the underlying
premise of Congressional action was technology.
Professor Martha McCarthy has done extensive research on the
topic of Internet censorship.257 Professor McCarthy has noted that
there are four primary ways by which children may gain access to
inappropriate materials on the Internet: various "commercial actors"
may transmit materials to children through cyberspace; "child
predators either send visual materials or talk with children in ways
considered harmful"; minors may intentionally locate illicit sites; and
minors find such sites accidentally.258
Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Reno v.
ACLU, Congress once again entered the fray and enacted two major
pieces of legislation in order to deal specifically with issues relating to
minors, the Internet, and certain "objectionable materials" that might
or might not be considered as pornography, but which might be
considered as harmful or as inappropriate.259 We will summarize two
important Supreme Court cases which arose out of litigation
concerning these statutes and then move to some concluding
comments on the core issue of technology-through the use of
Internet filters-as guarantor of effective parental and societal
control over objectionable materials reaching minors via the Internet.
In looking at the issue of technology, we will raise one final question:
254. Id. (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp., at 831 (finding 3)).
255. Internet World Statistics, The Internet Big Picture, http://www.internetworldstats.
com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
256. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (finding 74)).
257. See Martha McCarthy, The Continuing Saga of Internet Censorship: The Child
Online Protection Act, 2005 BYU EDU. & L.J. 83 (2005). We are indebted to Professor
McCarthy for providing an informative backdrop, as well as a logical construction, to the
statutory and case materials found in Part V of this study.
258. Id. at 84.
259. See infra Part V.B, V.D.
20091
Should "filter technology" ultimately prove unsuccessful,
unworkable, or overly burdensome in protecting minors, or should
the Internet prove to be beyond the scope of parental or adult.control
because of "filter bypass" techniques or some other counter-
technology, might not these factors bolster the government's
persistent contention that legislation and not technology is required
to deal with this recurring and important issue? Might a failure of
technology provide the justification for governmental action to
assume the role of censor regarding this or other future "new
media"?
B. Child Online Protection Act
In enacting the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") 260 in 1998,
Congress was clearly attempting to resolve some of the CDA's major
constitutional defects by significantly narrowing its intended scope.
COPA prohibits content harmful to minors (defined as those under
seventeen years of age)26' from "being distributed for commercial
purposes through the Internet., 26  The statute's "commercial
limitation" was defined in relation to individuals "engaged in the
business of making such communications" and required that any such
person devote "time, attention, or labor to such activities" as part of
their trade or business,263 so as to avoid casual, inadvertent, or non-
commercial applications. As an additional limitation, COPA
specifically targeted online communication that is publicly accessible
over the Internet. However, COPA was not "all-media or source
encompassing," and did not target all modes of online
communication. 264  For example, COPA specifically excluded e-
mail.2 65 COPA imposed both criminal and civil penalties on those
who knowingly made available such materials in interstate or foreign
260. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
261. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
262. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 86 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(d)(1)).
263. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2).
264. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 87 n.29 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(1)). The
prohibited material must be placed on the World Wide Web "using hypertext transfer
protocol or any successor protocol."
265. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4). The Center for Democracy and Technology notes,
however, that materials such as movies and television programs when disseminated
through popular websites were also covered by the Act. See Center for Democracy and
Technology, Child Online Protection Act (COPA), http://www.cdt.org/speech/copa (last
visited Aug. 31, 2009).
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commerce;266 however, the imposition of criminal penalties was the
most important and controversial provision. Similar to the CDA,
which had been found defective constitutionally, COPA provided an
affirmative defense to those who restricted access to prohibited
materials by reasonable measures "that are feasible under available
technology," such as requiring the use of a credit card, or an adult
identification number, or a digital certificate that verifies the age of
the potential user.61
COPA defined the term, materials harmful to minors, as any
communication that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards ... and with respect to minors is designed to appeal
to... the prurient interest; (B) depicts, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual
act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
268
minors.
Unsurprisingly, litigation challenging the constitutionality of
COPA was initiated on October 22, 1998.269 The litigation would
reach the United States Supreme Court on two separate occasions
and would stretch for more than a decade until January 21, 2009,
when the United States Supreme Court refused to hear any further
appeals of the lower court decisions-an action effectively killing the
bill.27°
266. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(a). Criminal penalties included a $50,000 fine and six months
in prison.
267. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).
268. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6). The statute thus attempted to incorporate the most salient
points of both Miller and Ginsburg in order to assuage any constitutional challenges and to
clarify the reaches of the Act.
269. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
270. See Scott Nichols, COPA Child-Porn Law Killed, PCWORLD, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.pcworld.comlarticle/158131/copa -childporn-law killed.html. See also Sean
Alfano, Judge Puts Porn Access Burden on Parents, CBSNEWS.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/22/tech/main2595647.shtml. The author quotes CBS
technical analyst Larry Magid as saying: "I think the judge gets it that the law would have
a chilling effect on free speech of adults while not protecting children. The law could have
shut down sites that are not only legal, but potentially beneficial, such as sites that
promote sexual health." Interestingly, the Center for Democracy and Technology had
noted that the Act would not have effectively prevented children from seeing
20091
84 HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. [32:1
The detailed procedural history of the case is most interesting. In
1999, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the Act, deciding that COPA was substantially likely to place an
impermissible burden on some forms of constitutionally protected
expression. 27' The District Court did not find evidence that imposing
criminal penalties on distributors of the targeted Web materials
constituted the least restrictive means available to achieve the
government's goal of restricting minors' access to harmful
communication on the Internet.272 On appeal, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion
273in granting the preliminary injunction. However, the Third Circuit
chose to employ a different rationale than the District Court in order
to justify the award of the injunction. The Court of Appeals
concluded that COPA's use of "community standards" made the law
unconstitutionally overbroad because distributors of Web materials
would potentially be required to gear messages to the most
conservative members of the community in order to satisfy this
requirements of the Act.274
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
rendered what would be its first COPA decision in 2002, in the case
colloquially known as Ashcroft L.275 The Supreme Court concluded
that COPA's use of "community standards" in order to identify
harmful materials did not in itself render the law unconstitutionally
overbroad. 276  The Supreme Court left the injunction in place, but
remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration on other
grounds.277
Upon remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reevaluated
the District Court's entry of an injunction against the enforcement of
COPA "in light of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court.
2 78
Rather than focusing solely on the "community standards" provision
of COPA, the Court "consider[ed] the other aspects of the District
inappropriate materials originating from outside the United States which are available
from other internet resources such as chat rooms or conventional e-mail. Center for
Democracy and Technology, supra note 265.
271. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
272. Id. at 497.
273. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2000).
274. Id. at 166.
275. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
276. Id. at 584-85.
277. Id. at 586.
278. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Court's analysis" and again affirmed the injunction.279 This time
around, the Court focused on the argument made by the ACLU that
there were less restrictive ways to achieve the government's goal-
mainly through the use of filtering devices-and that the government
had failed to prove that these alternative methods were not
effective.' °
The Court of Appeals analyzed the case under a strict scrutiny
standard281 and concluded that COPA likely violated the First
Amendment on two familiar grounds: that the statute was not
"narrowly tailored" and that the statute was overly broad.2  First, in
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court of Appeals held that
COPA would probably not be considered "narrowly tailored" to
serve a compelling government interest because the Act was not the
least restrictive means that could be employed to prevent minors
from gaining access to harmful materials on the Internet.283 Second,
the court of appeals reasoned that COPA would likely be found
"overbroad" because it placed significant burdens on the
dissemination of protected speech on the Internet and on adults'
constitutionally protected access to such speech.
The government once again appealed the decision of the Third
Circuit to the United States Supreme Court, in a case that has become
known as Ashcroft 1. 285
C. Ashcroft H
For a second time, the United States Supreme Court would
address the constitutionality of COPA . 8  In Ashcroft H, decided in
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's conclusion that
the District Court had not abused its discretion by entering the
preliminary injunction.2 7  However, the Supreme Court would
significantly narrow the ruling of the Third Circuit.2
A five-Justice majority on the United States Supreme Court
focused on the likelihood that the statute unconstitutionally burdens
279. Id.
280. Id. at 261-64.
281. Id. at 251.
282. Id. at 271.
283. Id. at 251.
284. Id. at 266.
285. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I1), 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
286. Id. at 659-60.
287. Id. at 660-61, 665.
288. Id. at 665.
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"some speech that is protected for adults." 9 Professor McCarthy
commented that, under these circumstances, "[t]he Court reasoned
that it was important to let the injunction stand pending a full trial
because of the potential harm that might result in chilling protected
speech that could result from prosecution of distributors of Internet
materials under COPA."2'9  The Supreme Court embraced and
reiterated its core First Amendment jurisprudence and concluded
that COPA likely violated the First Amendment because it imposed a
content-based restriction, noting that "the Constitution demands that
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid."'2 9' The
Supreme Court also stated that the Government must bear the
burden of proving the constitutionality of COPA.2'9
As the Court noted:
In considering this question, a court assumes that certain
protected speech may be regulated, and then asks what is the
least restrictive alternative that can be used to achieve that
goal. The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the
challenged restriction has some effect in achieving Congress'
goal, regardless of the restriction it imposes. The purpose of
the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that
legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.2 93
While keeping the injunction in place, the Supreme Court
suggested that the key question on remand to the District Court
would be "whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive
means among available, effective alternatives." '294  Although the
Supreme Court noted that Internet filters would be less restrictive
than the criminal sanctions enacted in COPA, the Court determined
that a remand to the District Court was necessary in order to
289. Id. at 665 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
290. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 89.
291. Ashcroft 11, 542 U.S. at 660.
292. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000).
In Playboy Entm't Group, the Supreme Court noted that a content-based regulation will
be upheld only if it passes judicial muster under a strict scrutiny test. Playboy, 529 U.S. at
813. Thus, a law that required cable operators to limit "sexually oriented" programs to
after 10 p.m. was held invalid because a less restrictive alternative existed enabling
individual households to block undesired channels. Id. at 803.
293. Ashcroft I, 542 U.S. at 666.
294. Id.
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determine the effectiveness and reliability of such filtering software.2 95
The Supreme Court also asked the District Court to determine
whether further evidence might be adduced on the relative efficacy of
296any alternatives to the statute. In remanding the case for further
proceedings to the District Court, the Supreme Court indicated that it
might be possible for the government to meet its burden of showing
that Congress had constitutionally accomplished its goal of
safeguarding children from harmful materials via the Internet and
that COPA was the least restrictive alternative available to
accomplish Congress' goal.297 However, the Supreme Court raised
grave doubts about this eventuality.299
The majority in Ashcroft II set the parameters for the evaluation
of COPA and, by implication, for future attempts to regulate the
transmission of "harmful materials" via the Internet. In so doing, the
Court expressed its clear preference for technology over both
regulation and legislation. The Supreme Court recognized that "it is
incorrect... to say that filters are part of the current regulatory status
quo." 299 However, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
Congress was not authorized to mandate filtering software through
legislation, stating that Congress "undoubtedly may act to encourage
the use of filters."'  The Court also noted
[t]hat filtering software may well be more effective than
COPA is confirmed by the findings of the Commission on
Child Online Protection, a blue-ribbon Commission created
by Congress in COPA itself. Congress directed the
Commission to evaluate the relative merits of different means
of restricting minors' ability to gain access to harmful
materials on the Internet. 3°'
What was at the core of this belief? The Supreme Court noted
that filters and filtering technology may be more effective than the
imposition of criminal penalties for several reasons. First, filters
"impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not
295. Id. at 668-69.
296. Id. at 672-73.
297. Id.
298. Id
299. See id. at 669.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 668.
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universal restrictions at the source."' ' Second, while filters may be
successful in protecting minors from harmful or inappropriate
materials, adults may continue to access constitutionally protected
speech by disconnecting, disabling, or simply turning off the filter) 3
Third, the majority of the Supreme Court recognized that technology
had substantially changed since the District Court made its initial
findings of fact, so that filters were much more reliable and were less
likely to either overblock or underblock web sites.3'O Finally,
requiring the use of a credit card to access the Internet may not be as
successful in keeping minors away from impermissible sites as would
filters, since, in fact, some minors possess such cards or may have
access to them in their own names.305
Interestingly, Professor McCarthy noted that the Court in
Ashcroft II was also not persuaded by the government's argument
that "COPA's application to only commercial communication
reduced the law's substantial constitutional defects."3'06 The Court
could find no legal justification for this distinction. In addition, the
majority recognized that the legal landscape and factual context had
also substantially changed since the case was first filed because
Congress had enacted two Internet-related federal statutes in the
interim-perhaps reducing the need for a statute as broad and
encompassing as COPA. °7
Congress had enacted a prohibition on adopting misleading
domain names in order to prevent web site owners from essentially
disguising pornographic sites, thus making it more difficult for parents
to exercise their own independent judgment as to the suitability of the
site.3" In addition, Professor McCarthy noted that Congress had also
enacted a law creating a second-level Internet domain, "kids.us,"
which had content that is restricted to appropriate material for minors
under age 13.'09  Thus, the Court reasoned, the justification for
COPA's criminal sanctions may not be as great as when the law was
enacted in 1998 since the rapid pace of development of new
302. Id. at 667.
303. Id.
304. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 90.
305. Ashcroft 11, 542 U.S. at 657.
306. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 91 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 90.
308. 18 U.S.C. § 2252B (2006).
309. McCarthy, supra note 257, at 91 n.68 (citing Dot Kids Implementation and
Effectiveness Act of 2002, 47 U.S.C. § 941 (2006).
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technologies and safeguards might in themselves be sufficient to
restrict access by minors to specific materials deemed "harmful.""31
The Supreme Court once again remanded the case to the district
court for a trial,31' which commenced on October 23, 2006.312
Predictably, district court Judge Lowell A. Reed once again enjoined
enforcement of COPA, striking down the Act on constitutional
grounds.313 Judge Reed noted that, "perhaps we do the minors of this
country harm if First Amendment protections, which they will with
age inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of their protection. '
The government again appealed, but, on July 22, 2008, the Third
Circuit upheld its 2007 decision, this time under the name of ACLU v.
Mukasey."5 Additionally, as noted earlier, on January 21, 2009, the
Supreme Court refused to hear a further appeal of the circuit court's
decision, effectively killing the bill-this time, presumably, for
good! 316
D. The Children's Internet Protection Act
A second statute, the Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA"), was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000 as a
part of an omnibus spending bill.317  The final version of the bill
passed the Senate and House of Representatives on December 15,
2000, and was signed by the President on December 21, 2000.318 This
Act, under the original sponsorship of Senator John McCain of
310. Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 663.
311. Id. at 673.
312. ACLU v. Gonzalez (Gonzales), 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
Interestingly, in preparation for the trial, pursuant to Rule 45(c)(2)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Department of Justice had issued subpoenas to various
search engine operators in order to obtain Web addresses and records of Internet searches
as a part of a study undertaken by a government witness in support of the law's
constitutionality. See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 2006). All
parties complied except for Google, which challenged the subpoenas. Id. The district
court limited the subpoena to a sample of URLs in Google's database, but refused to
support the request for information on searches conducted by Google users. Id. at 688.
See also Posting of Nicole Wong to Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2006/03/judge-tells-doj-no-on-search-queries.html (Mar. 17 2006, 18:00 PST).
313. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 777-78.
314. Id. at 821.
315. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181,206-07 (3d Cir. 2008).
316. Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032, 1032 (2009). See also Scott Nichols, COPA
Child-Porn Law Killed, PC WORLD, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.pcworld.com/articlel
158131/copachildporn law -killed.html.
317. Child Stop - childstop.com, Children's Internet Protection Act, http://www.
childstop.com/childrens-internet-protection-act.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
318. Id.
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Arizona, in contrast to the CDA, focused on recipients rather than the
senders of Internet transmissions. 319 The Act was designed to address
"the problems associated with availability of Internet pornography in
public libraries. 3 20  The CIPA required public libraries and school
districts that received federal technology funds to enact Internet
safety policies for minors that included the use of filtering measures
to protect children from access to images that are "harmful to
minors."" '  The Supreme Court noted that Congress had become
increasingly concerned that the E-Rate Program ("E-Rate") and
Library Services and Technologies Act ("LSTA") programs were in
fact "facilitating access to illegal and harmful pornography.,
322
Interestingly, the law did not specify any particular technology or
type of filter that had to be used by the recipients. The statute simply
defined a "technology protection measure" as a "specific technology
that blocks or filters Internet access to materials covered by" the
CIPA.3 23  In addition, and perhaps in response to concerns raised
about denying access to materials that would be suitable for adults,
the Act permits the library to "disable" the filter in order to "enable
access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes.
3 24
Once again, as might have been anticipated, the Act was
challenged on constitutional grounds by a group of library
associations, patrons, web site publishers, and civil liberties groups.
3 25
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that
319. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
320. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n (Am. Library 11), 539 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2003).
321. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B). For a detailed discussion of CIPA requirements, see
Federal Communications Commission (Consumer & Government Affairs Bureau),
Children's Internet Protection Act, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cipa.html (last
visited July 10, 2009). It is interesting to note the requirements of the CIPA:
Schools and libraries subject to CIPA are required to adopt and
implement a policy addressing: (a) access by minors to inappropriate
matter on the Internet; (b) the safety and security of minors when using
electronic mail, chat rooms, and other forms of direct electronic
communications; (c) unauthorized access, including so-called "hacking,"
and other unlawful activities by minors online; (d) unauthorized
disclosure, use, and dissemination of personal information regarding
minors; and (e) restricting minors' access to materials harmful to them.
Id.
322. Am. Library 11, 539 U.S. at 200 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-225, at 5 (1998)).
323. Id. at 201 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I)).
324. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (f)(3) (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(D)).
325. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States (Am. Library 1), 201 F. Supp. 2d 401(E.D. Pa.
2002).
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the CIPA was "facially unconstitutional" and enjoined the
government from withholding federal assistance because of a failure
of a recipient of federal funding to comply with the various provisions
of the Act.326 In so doing, the district court held, inter alia: that
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause,3"
because any public library that would comply with the conditions
found in the CIPA will necessarily violate the First Amendment;
32
that the CIPA filtering software constitutes a content-based
restriction on access to a "public forum" that would be subject to a
strict scrutiny analysis;32 9 and that, although the government had a
compelling interest in preventing the dissemination of obscenity, child
pornography, or materials harmful to minors, the use of software
filters was not narrowly tailored to further that interest
3°
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in United States v. American
Library Association, disagreed with the district court, in an opinion
that was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.331 Justices Kennedy and Breyer filed
separate concurring opinions.332 The Supreme Court reiterated its
long held view that it was certainly within the power of Congress to
attach reasonable conditions to the receipt of federal funds in order
to further its policy objectives, so long as the conditions imposed do
not abridge constitutional rights or "induce" the recipient to "engage
in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.,
333
In reaching its decision to uphold the constitutionality of CIPA,
the Supreme Court engaged in a careful analysis of the "societal role"
of libraries, and noted that, in order to "fulfill their traditional
missions of facilitating learning and cultural enrichment, public
libraries must have broad discretion to decide what materials to
provide to their patrons." '334 The Court noted that, within broad
326. Id. at 495.
327. "Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes ... to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
328. Am. Library 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
329. Id. at 454 (citing United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) ("[A] content-based speech restriction . . . can only stand if it satisfies strict
scrutiny.")).
330. Id. at 479.
331. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
332. Id. at 214-15.
333. Am. Library 11, 539 U.S. at 203.
334. Id. at 195. See also Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669
(1998) (holding that a public television station debate for congressional candidates from
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limits, "when the government appropriates funds to establish a
program[,] it is entitled to define the limits of that program." '335 The
Court stated that the CIPA does not "penalize" libraries that chose
not to install such filtering software, or deny to them the right to
provide their Internet patrons with unfiltered access to the Internet.336
Rather, "CIPA simply reflects Congress' decision not to subsidize
their doing So., 3
37
Then, from a constitutional point of view, the Supreme Court
declined to apply "heightened judicial scrutiny" in reviewing the
statute, noting that heightened scrutiny would be incompatible with
the "broad discretion" that public libraries must have in order to
consider content in making acquisition decisions. 338  The Court
emphasized that a public library is not creating a public forum when it
acquires Internet terminals.33 ' Rather, a library provides Internet
access in order to "facilitate research, learning, and recreational
pursuits" and that a "public library does not acquire Internet
terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to
express themselves .... 3 0  The Court reasoned that, since libraries
can constitutionally exclude pornography from their print collections
without being subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny, they should
similarly be able to block online or Internet pornography.34 Further,
major parties or those who have demonstrated strong popular support is not a "public
forum"); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (a requirement
that the NEA consider standards of "decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public" when deciding whether to make grants was held to be
facially valid). In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the government had broad
discretion to make content based judgments in deciding what private speech would be
made available to the public.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Breyer argued that while "strict
scrutiny" should not be required, he would apply a "heightened scrutiny" analysis as the
Court has utilized in other cases where speech-related restrictions had been examined.
Am. Library H, 539 U.S. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer is also clear about
the method of analysis the Supreme Court should undertake in such cases. According to
Justice Breyer, the Court must ask "whether the harm to speech-related interests is
disproportionate in light of both the justifications [for the governmental action] and the
potential alternatives;" it must consider the legitimacy of the objective of the statute or
administrative rule; and "whether there are other, less restrictive ways of achieving that
objective." Id. at 217-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
335. Am. Library H, 539 U.S. at 211 (plurality opinion).
336. Id. at 212.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 205.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 206
341. Id. at 208, 205.
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"[i]nternet access in public libraries is neither 'traditional' nor a
'designated' public forum.'"
The Court rejected the contention that requiring filtering software
"distort[s] the usual functioning of public libraries" by imposing
viewpoint-based restrictions on a public library."3  The Court
distinguished CIPA from the factual circumstances presented in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, where the Court had stated that Legal
Services Corp. must remain free of any conditions attached by
benefactors to the use of any donated funds.3" The Court in
American Librasry Ass'n noted that, in contrast to lawyers
representing a client in a welfare dispute with the government,
libraries have "no comparative role that pits them against the
government.",4
5
Finally, the Court addressed the contention that requiring
filtering software would prevent adult library patrons from gaining
access to some constitutionally protected expression rights.3" In his
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the statute contained an
important exception that limited the "speech-related harm."" 7 Given
that the technology allowed filters to be disabled for an adult patron,
the Act allows libraries to "permit any adult patron access to an
'overblocked' Web site. The adult patron need only ask a librarian to
unblock the specific Web site, or alternatively, ask the librarian,
'Please disable the entire filter."'
348
342. Id.
343. Id. at 212.
344. 531 U.S. 533,548-49 (2001).
345. Am. Library 11, 539 U.S. at 213.
346. Id. at 208-09.
347. Id. at 219 (Breyer, J., concurring).
348. Id. The issue of "unblocking" proved to be rather vexatious-and important.
Chief Justice Rehnquist had noted that
[a]ssuming that such erroneous blocking presents constitutional
difficulties, any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which
patrons may have the filtering software disabled. When a patron
encounters a blocked site, he need only ask a librarian to unblock it or [at
least in the case of adults] disable the filter.
Id. at 209 (plurality opinion). The FCC subsequently instructed libraries complying with
CIPA to implement a procedure suitable for unblocking the filter upon a request by an
adult. FCC Order 03-188 (July 24, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/FCC-03-188Al.pdf. The actual text of the Act authorized libraries and
other institutions to disable the filter on request for "bona fide research or other lawful
purpose." 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3). Thus, an adult was required to present some form of
justification for the request. The Supreme Court, however, adopted the interpretation
suggested by the Attorney General that libraries would be required to adopt an adult use
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In summation, Justice Kennedy wrote:
The interest in protecting young library users from material
inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even compelling
.... Given this interest, and the failure to show that adult
library users' access to the material is burdened in any
significant degree, the statute is not unconstitutional on its
face."49
A careful reading of both Ashcroft I and II, in conjunction with
American Library Association, reveals that the Supreme Court has
placed great weight on the ability of technology to assuage any
constitutional concerns.
VI. Implications and Tentative Conclusions
Recently, several applications of the policy debate occurring
within the United States have developed internationally. These
disputes may directly impact on the question of Internet restrictions
both within the United States and in the international arena.
A. International Implications
To most observers, it is obvious that the paradigm of media
assessment has shifted dramatically in recent years towards the
Internet and away from more traditional means of communications of
speech such as the radio and film-the media which spurred the
constitutional conversations and controversies found in Burstyn and
Pacifica Foundation.
Somewhat prescient in their assessment of the trajectory of the
Internet's growth in the United States, the Supreme Court, however,
could have not predicted the rapid explosion in world Internet use.
Twenty countries, including China, the United States, India, and
Russia, account for nearly seventy-seven percent of all world Internet
users, leaving 226 countries accounting for the remaining twenty-
three percent of Internet use.350 China and Russia's rate of growth in
policy for unblocking the Internet without a requirement that the library inquire about the
user's reasons for the request to disable the filter. Am. Library 11, 539 U.S. at 209.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court added, perhaps somewhat
wryly: "The Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a public
library without any risk of embarrassment." Id.
349. Am. Library 11, 539 U.S. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
350. Internet World Stats, Top 20 Countries with Highest Numbers of Internet Users,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited Sept. 18. 2009).
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Internet users for the same period is over 1,000 percent each, while
the U.S.'s growth is 138 percent.35' However, the percent of the
population with access to the Internet is seventy-four percent in the
United States, with twenty-seven percent and twenty-two percent in
Russia and China, respectively.352 With only less than a quarter of its
population having access to the Internet, China still represents the
largest world user, followed by the United States. Regarding global
monthly average use, Nielsen Online reports that users spend thirty-
eight hours per month on their personal computers and one hour per
web surfing session, resulting in visits to 1,591 pages per person per
month. 353 Technology also makes it possible to track the flow of data
around the world through the Internet. The Internet Traffic Report
reports on a world map the speed and reliability of connections, by
world region, through an index between zero and 100 (the higher the
index, the faster and more reliable the connection in that region).354
In the context of world Internet use, there is a growing debate
regarding the intentions of the Chinese government, who are
proactively attempting to limit access to the Internet on "policy"
grounds eerily similar to the rationale offered in Burstyn. The
implications are truly staggering because, as noted above, there are as
many as 300 million Chinese internet users and Internet use is on the
rise.355 Interestingly, in June 2009, the Chinese government accused
Google's English-language world-wide search engine of spreading
"vulgar content" (recall the "sacrilegious" standard proffered in
Burstyn) and indicated that the Chinese government had carried out
"punishment measures. 35 6 Malcolm Moore, a reporter for a British
newspaper, has raised concerns about the Chinese action and
indicated that Google had been repeatedly blocked in China for
actions that were "upsetting to the regime." '357 The first actions
occurred as early as 2002.358 In blocking Google, an official from the
Chinese Foreign Ministry stated, "I want to stress that Google China
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Nielsen Online Global Index Chart, http://www.nielsen-online.com/resources.jsp?
section=pr netv (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
354. See Internet Traffic Report, http://www.internettrafficreport.com (last visited Sept.
10, 2009).
355. Top 20 Countries with Highest Numbers of Internet Users, supra note 350.
356. Malcolm Moore, 'Vulgar' Google Blocked by China, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 26, 2008, at 21.
357. Id.
358. Danny Sullivan, China's Great Wall Against Google and AltaVista, SEARCH
ENGINE WATCH, Sept. 16, 2002, http://searchenginewatch.com/2165031.
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is a company operating within China to provide Internet search
services and it should strictly abide by Chinese laws and
regulations."35 9  The government essentially accused Google of
"spreading pornography"-although the article speculated that the
"block could be linked to competition with the Chinese internet
search engine, Baidu. 3'6 Jeremy Goldkorn, the founder of Danwei, a
website that analyzes the Chinese media, indicated that the order to
ban Google "had probably been vaguely communicated to internet
companies" in China.
61
In light of the actions of the Chinese government, the Obama
administration, through the interventions of Gary Locke, U.S.
Commerce Secretary, and Ron Kirk, the U.S. Trade Representative,
immediately lodged a formal protest against the Chinese government
over its plans to require that all computers in China be equipped with
computer software that would block access to certain websites.3 62 The
Chinese government maintained that the filtering software, known as
Green Dam-Youth Escort, was designed to block pornography and
other "unhealthy information. 363  In rejecting the Chinese
contentions, Kirk noted that "[p]rotecting children from
inappropriate content is a legitimate objective, but this is an
inappropriate means that is likely to have a broader scope"-raising
the larger question of "whether the software would lead to more
censorship of the Internet in China."3'6  Loretta Chao, of the Wall
Street Journal, noted that "[t]he software, which the government says
was designed to filter out pornography and other contents
inappropriate for children, has been found by researchers to be
capable of filtering political content as well. It would add an extra
layer to China's wide-reaching methods of regulating Internet use.3 1
65
The ban, introduced on short notice, was also challenged on grounds
that it might violate World Trade Organization rules because
companies, such as Hewlett-Packard Co., a U.S. corporation, and
359. Moore, supra note 356.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Saul Hansell, U.S. Asks China to Rescind Edict Requiring Web Filters, INT'L




365. Loretta Chao, U.S. Urges China to Revoke PC Software Rule; Beijing's Order to
Pre-Install Web Filters on Computers Set to Take Effect on July 1[2009], GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), June 25, 2009, at Bl.
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Dell Inc.-Lenovo Group Ltd. of China, were given only six weeks'
notice to comply with its terms.366
Ironically, an American firm, Solid Oak Software, claims that
Green Dam includes stolen copyrighted code from one of its
proprietary products, and has launched legal action. 367  Experts
quoted in an Economist article stressed the more nefarious
interpretation of the ban, rejecting the Chinese contention that Green
Dam was designed to protect young people from "unhealthy" and
"poisonous" pornographic and violent content, and instead noting
that "Michigan experts found that it also scans text for 'politically
sensitive' phrases. ' 68  As of July 2009, the Chinese government
indicated it was rethinking its policy.
69
Beyond China's position on the fundamental right of nations to
require filters in search engines like Google or Bing, the growing
threat of cyberwar attacks that could wreak havoc on computer
systems and the Internet has also resulted in a heated dispute
between Russia and the United States. Russia is proposing an
international treaty similar to the one negotiated for chemical
weapons and has pressed for this approach, while the United States
argues that a treaty is unnecessary, pushing instead for improved
cooperation among international law enforcement groups.370 As of
July 2009, an Internet denial-of-service attack aimed at twenty-seven
American and South Korean government agencies and commercial
websites jammed more than a third of the websites for a period of at
least five days.37' South Korean officials proceeded to accuse North
Korean military or intelligence agents of being responsible for the
attack in retaliation for newly imposed United Nations sanctions.372
John Markoff, of the New York Times, reports that "cyberwarfare
specialists cautioned.., that the Internet was effectively a 'wilderness
366. Id.
367. Dammed if You Do, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, at 49.
368. Id.
369. Posting of Sky Canaves to Wall Street Journal Blogs: China, http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinajournal/2009/07/01/green-dam-and-the-politics-of-consent (July 1, 2009, 01:47 EST).
370. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009 at Al, available at http:/Iwww.nytines.coml
2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html.
371. Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Cyberattacks Jam Government and Commercial
Web Sites in U.S. and South Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009 at A4, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/technology/O9cyber.html.
372. John Markoff, Internet's Anonymity Makes Cyberattack Hard to Trace, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2009 at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/technology/
17cyber.html.
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of mirrors,' and that attributing the source of cyberattacks and other
kinds of exploitation is difficult at best and sometimes impossible." '373
The policy debate in Washington D.C. has intensified as a result-of
course, adding a new dimension to the saga of Internet controls.
B. Returning to the Core Issue Concerning Technology
Returning to the issue of parental control of content of
information reaching children via the Internet, much remains to be
determined. Wireless technology has brought increased vigilance to
what was already a problem-ridden industry. The effectiveness of
filtering devices on a home computer or network, already
questionable, may fail totally outside the home, depending on the
child's skills, abilities, and desires to obtain inappropriate materials.
A careful reading of Supreme Court decisions indicates that the
focus has shifted to the use of software filters. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that these filters may be considered as the "least
restrictive" means to protect minors. As Professor McCarthy notes,
however, "The criteria used by software companies in deciding which
sites to block often are not transparent, so their congruence with legal
standards is difficult to ascertain.,
374
In looking carefully at "filter technology," it is possible to identify
certain generic or perhaps endemic problems, issues, or concerns that
plague the entire area. These include: issues relating to
"overblocking" or "underblocking" continue to persist as they relate
to the ability of a filter to block pornographic pictures or images that
are not accompanied by text;375 the availability of software designed
to monitor content that is retrieved rather than to block a particularly
identified site, which may alleviate some of the concerns raised
regarding "overblocking" and "underblocking";3 76 the fact that many
decisions relating to restrictions on particular sites or Internet content
are ideally to be devised by the community but in reality are being
373. Id.
374. McCarthy, supra note 163, at 95 (citing Paul Smith, Free Speech Groups to
Filtering Companies: Come Clean, ESCHOOL NEWS (Aug. 2003), at 8). Professor
McCarthy has raised a number of these issues in the discussion of Internet filtering in her
seminal article.
375. See Kevin Saunders, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as
Adults? The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to Provide for the
Protection of Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257, 259 (2004).
376. See generally, Committee to Study Tools and Strategies for Protecting Kids from
Pornography, National Research Council, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET
(Dick Thornburgh & Herbert Lin eds., National Academies, 2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/youth-internet (last visited July 17, 2009).
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made by software developers; the possibility that problems relating to
a minor's access to harmful materials-no matter how constitutionally
that may be defined in the future-might be addressed by a process
known as internet zoning, in essence creating a separate "X-rated
Internet domain" that could only be accessed with software
purchased with age verification 377 -adopting the viewpoint that the
burden of protecting minors should be placed on individuals who are
attempting to gain access to any such "X-rated zone" rather than on
the developers, creators, or distributors of the alleged offensive or
inappropriate materials;3 78 the fact that many parents are unaware of
filters or filter technology or that many parents may not be inclined to
censor their children's Internet access;379 the difficulties inherent in
applying "community standards" to the determination of what is or
may be considered "harmful" to a minor, in short, because of the
truly "global reach of the transmissions to very diverse communities
and countries"; 3' questions of the definition of the word "minor"
itself, asking whether the term refers "in a literal sense to an infant, a
five year old, or a person just shy of age seventeen"31 ; and the
question of whether there should be different categories of minors,
with greater protections being afforded to younger children or
younger minors.3" One commentator, Amitai Etzioni, a distinguished
professor of sociology, suggested that a possible solution lies in
having separate computers for children and adults-which
presumably might work in a library or video-rental setting, but would
be quite problematic regarding home computers where some amount
of censorship under the guise of parental involvement would still be
required 3
377. See Todd A. Nair, Finding the Right Approach: A Constitutional Alternative to
Shielding Kids from Harmful Materials Online, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 481-85 (2004). This
approach may be analogized to that found in many "adult bookstores" where certain
materials would be placed "in a secluded location, off in the back, where children cannot
go." Id. at 490.
378. Id. at 481.
379. Id. at 33.
380. McCarthy, supra note 250, at 98 (citing, e.g., Kelly M. Doherty, An Analysis of
Obscenity and Indecency on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REV. 259 (1999)).
381. Interestingly, the government, in its defense of COPA, had argued that "minors"
are older adolescents who may be capable of possessing a prurient interest"-harkening
back to the definition of pornography found in Miller. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at
253,256.
382. McCarthy, supra note 250, at 100.
383. Amitai Etzioni, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?
On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 28-29 (2004).
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C. Concluding Comments
What generations have previously sought out in pictures and
magazines can now be found online-only much more graphically
and explicitly-and some of it with much hate, bigotry, and violence.
Not only mobile phones, but also laptop computers, and any
handheld portable device or toy such as a Play Station Portable or
Nintendo which has Internet access "can download porn from any
unsecured server they find on a street corner." '' Once downloaded,
those materials can be copied and played on any device, despite the
presence of a filter.
In 2008, Nielsen reported that 77 percent of U.S. teens had their
own mobile phone and another 11 percent said that they regularly
borrowed one.3 85 The same report also described teens as "users of
advanced mobile data features., 386 Nielsen also reported that "37%
of U.S. mobile subscribers 13-17 accessed the Internet on their
mobile phone-this ranks U.S. teens second behind 50% of China's
mobile teens, in terms of mobile Internet penetration.""" Another
survey on teen usage of mobile phones by Cox Communications, in
conjunction with the Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
found that one-fifth of teen users surveyed said that they had engaged
in "sexting" (sending, receiving, or forwarding text messages
containing nude photos) and 44 percent said that they had no
parental controls of any kind on their cell phones' Internet access.""'
Children are accessing the Internet on their mobile phones at an
even earlier age. Another Nielsen report found that one-third of U.S.
"tweens" (ages 8-12) had their own mobile phone.389 Of those, some
5 percent access the Internet over the phone each month.39° What
may be more telling from this survey's data, however, is the fact that,
like their teen counterparts, "mobile content is also a social medium
for this audience: 26% of tween mobile internet users say they access
384. Barbara Biggs, Kid Porn Battle Needs More Than Filters, COURIER MAIL
(Australia), Nov. 29, 2007, at 35.




388. Cox Communications, Teen Summit on Internet & Wireless Safety, http://www.
cox.com/takecharge/safe-teens_- 2009/ (last visited July 17, 2009).




the web while at a friend's house and 17% say they do so at social
events. "3 91
Increasing concerns regarding children viewing not only
pornography and other obscene materials, but also cybercrimes of all
sorts involving children, including online bullying, child grooming by
pedophiles, and privacy issues involving the use of GPS systems, have
once again turned the discussion toward regulation. While some
parts of the world take positions such as that of China, requiring
filters on search engines, other parts of the world watch the U.S. with
interest. "What happens in the USA with respect to the Internet has
great significance in Internet jurisprudence for the simple reason that
a majority of Internet related litigation takes place in that country.'392
391. Id.
392. Abhilash Nair, Mobile Phones and the Internet: Legal Issues in the Protection of
Children, INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 20 (March-July 2006).
20091 THE SUPREME COURT AS THE "GRAND MEDIATOR"
102 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [32:1
